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Introduction 
Hundreds of billions of dollars in payments are 
made each day in the United States. The system 
that enables this enormous sum to change hands 
includes several different mechanisms. Probably 
the largest number of payments, but with the 
smallest total dollar value, are made by using 
coins and paper money. Another very large num- 
ber of payments, with a daily total value in the 
neighborhood of $75 billion, are made by using 
checks, credit cards, and direct transfers through 
automated clearinghouses. The smallest number 
of  payments, but representing by far the largest 
total dollar value-frequently $500 billion a day- 
are made using so-called wire transfers of funds. 
Wire transfers move balances elec- 
tronically at Federal Reserve Banks from one 
bank's deposit account to another's on the same 
day. Transfers can be carried out over any of sev- 
eral wire networks (large-dollar transfer systems) 
connecting banks to one another and to the Fed- 
eral Reserve Banks.' In this way, banks make pay- 
ments that handle their own short-term financing 
transactions as well as payments on behalf of 
themselves and their customers. These payments, 
in turn, reflect much of the dollar-denominated 
securities and foreign exchange market trading of 
the world. 
March 27, 1986 was the effective 
The  word "bank will be  used here in a generic sense, and in-  1  cludes commercial banks, thrift institutions, Edge Act and Agree- 
ment Corporations, U. S.  Branches and Agencies of  Foreign Banks, and 
New York Article XI1 Investment Companies. 
date of a Federal Reserve Board of Governors'  17 
policy to control risks in large-dollar transfer sys- 
tems. Adjustment to that policy has been smooth, 
as expected, for two reasons.2 First, consultation 
and public comment on the need for and nature 
of the program have been ongoing for a number 
of years. The actual policy was announced in May 
of last year. Since then, both the Federal Reserve 
Banks and private consultants have been conduct- 
ing informational meetings for banks across the 
nation. Second, the risk-control mechanism that 
became effective on March 27 embodies only a 
modest initial effort at risk reduction. With the 
mechanism in place, however, future steps to re- 
duce risk become more feasible. How smoothly fu- 
ture risk reduction can be assimilated will de- 
pend on the ease with which financing practices 
of banks and institutional arrangements for mak- 
ing certain kinds of payments can adapt to the ris- 
ing cost of risk implied by the risk-control policy. 
This article briefly describes sources 
of risk in large-dollar transfer systems and dis- 
cusses major features of the new mechanism for 
risk control.3 Then, examples of potential changes 
2  This expectation was supported by a survey done just before 
March. See "Findings: Survey on Implementation Status of 
Reduction of Payment System Risk,"  Bank Administration Institute, Jan- 
uary 23,  1986. 
3 
No.  R 
A full description of the policy may be found in "Policy Statement 
Regarding Risks on Large-Dollar Wire Transfer Systems" (Docket 
-0515), Board of  Governors of the Federal  ReseNe System. Dis- 
cussion of the risk problem is in: E.  J. Stevens, "Risk in Large Dollar 
Transfer Systems," FRB  of Cleveland Economic Review, Fall 1984, pp. 
2-16. 
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in financing and payments practices that might 
facilitate future risk reduction are examined. 
I. Risk Exposure 
The risk being controlled is the threat that pay- 
ments made over one of the large-dollar transfer 
systems can't be settled. None of these systems 
operates on a real time, cash-in-advance basis that 
would continuously settle by deducting each pay- 
ment, minute by minute, as it occurs, from the bal- 
ance in an account. Instead, they are "batched"  set- 
tlement systems that update accounts only at the 
end of the day by the net of payments and receipts 
during the day. It is possible, therefore, for a de- 
pository institution to transfer large sums during 
the day before it has received all the funds needed 
to settle its account at a Federal Reserve Bank. If 
the needed funds can't be acquired, a settlement 
failure occurs. 
A settlement failure is a rare event 
in the United States. Many banks have failed to 
open in the morning, but few in modem history 
have failed to settle their accounts at a Federal 
Reserve Bank the previous evening. Ultimately, 
who stands to lose in the event of a settlement 
failure depends in part on whether the large- 
dollar transfer system involved is a net settlement 
system, or Fedwire. The leading example of a net 
settlement system is CHIPS (Clearing House 
Interbank Payments System), a private telecom- 
munications clearinghouse payments network 
operated by the New York Clearing House. Partic- 
ipants exchange provisional payments messages 
during the day, but payments become final only 
at the end of each day when the net position 
(receipts, minus payments) of each participant is 
settled through accounts at Federal Reserve 
Banks.4  Inability of a participant to settle in this 
type of system suggests that one or more other 
participants or their customers are at risk because 
the Federal Reserve will not effect a net settle- 
ment order at day's end if one or more partici- 
pants have insufficient balances. On the other 
hand, Fedwire, a wire transfer system operated by 
the Federal Reserve, makes payments by transfer- 
ring funds directly from one depository's account 
at a Federal Reserve Bank to that of another.5 
Inability of a Fedwire user to cover its payments 
at the end of a day means that a Reserve Bank 
.......................................... 
4 
This brief description simplifies a more complex settlement pro- 
cess. Only 22 banks' accounts actually receive a debit or credit at 
Federal Reserve Banks. Ten of these banks seltle for  the remaining 112 
participants. A failure might reflect the inability of  one of the 22 to settle 
its own position, or of one of the associate banks to meet its settlement 
obligation with a settling participant. 
It is immaterial that the depositories may hold accounts at differ-  5 ent Reserve Banks because the Federal  Reserve Banks 'settle- 
up" among themselves at the end of  each day. 
takes the loss, because funds received by a bank 
over Fedwire during the day are irrevocable once 
notification of a payment is received. 
In both cases, risk arises because a 
bank can send more funds before the end of a 
day than are covered by its initial balance, plus its 
receipts, to that point during the day. Such a prac- 
tice results in a "daylight overdraft." For example, 
consider a bank continuously borrowing overnight 
in the federal funds market: each morning it returns 
the previous day's borrowing over Fedwire, but 
can't actually cover that return of funds until later 
in the day when new borrowing has been arranged 
and received. The risk is that a bank might be 
unable to arrange sufficient new borrowing and 
therefore fail to repay its daylight overdraft. 
Daylight overdrafts reflect daylight 
credit provided to the overdrafting bank either by 
the Federal Reserve on Fedwire, or by other 
banks on a net settlement system. The practice of 
relying on daylight credit creates credit risk for 
banks vis-a-vis their customers, for Federal 
Reserve Banks vis-a-vis Fedwire users, and for par- 
ticipants in net settlement systems vis-a-vis one 
another. Systemic risk is also created in the last 
case because the unexpected failure of one bank 
to settle might have a ripple effect as that failure 
makes it impossible for other banks to settle. In 
such a case, there is the potential for causing a 
classic banking crisis that could disrupt financial 
markets worldwide.6 Rapid growth of large-dollar 
transfers relative to reserve deposit balances sug- 
gests that banks commonly resort to daylight 
credit to finance payments during the day.' 
The Federal Reserve does not con- 
done daylight overdrafts and, until relatively re- 
cently, they were probably rare. It was not until 
1979 that the first measurement of daylight over- 
drafts was taken. Therefore, aggregate values of 
transfers relative to banks' deposit balances at 
Federal Reserve Banks is only suggestive of the 
likely growth of daylight overdrafts. Transfers 
were only about 20 percent of balances in 1950, 
150 percent in 1970, but approaching 3000 percent 
in the past few years. Now, with use of powerhl 
computerized accounting systems, it is possible 
for a bank to maintain an on-line monitor of its 
own and customers' daylight overdrafts. The Fed- 
eral Reserve is able to monitor the daylight over- 
drafts of a bank across all large-dollar networks, at 
least after the fact. In the future, large-dollar trans- 
.......................................... 
6 
A thorough analysis of systemic risk is in David B.  Humphrey, 
"Payments Finality and Risk of  Settlement Failure: Implications 
for  Financial Malkets."  Paper prepared for Conference on Technology 
and the Regulation of Financial Markets, New York University, May 
1985. 
Marcia L. Stigum cites the example of a large money center bank  7  with daily payments 2E  times its tota/assets. The Money 
Market, Homewood, Illinois, Dow Jones, I-win, 1983. p.  585-6. 
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fer systems conceivably could operate on-line 
real time monitors that would prevent the use of 
daylight credit completely, thus requiring that 
cash be available in advance of each payment. 
Daylight credit exposure is not a 
unique indicator of risk. Risk depends on the 
probability that institutions will not cover their 
daylight overdrafts by the end of a day, as well as, 
in the event of an actual failure to settle, the 
probability that claimants won't recover some or 
all of their loss in the liquidation of a failed insti- 
tution. Payment system risk then depends jointly 
on the amount of daylight credit, on the sound- 
ness of institutions in daylight overdraft positions, 
and on the ability of depository institutions to 
control the amount of payments-related credit 
extended to other depository institutions during a 
day. Systemic risk-the risk that otherwise sound 
institutions will be swept up in a cascade of set- 
tlement failures-depends as well on the interre- 
latedness of institutions in the payments system. 
This is influenced heavily by the ability of the 
central bank, in its role as lender-of-last-resort,  to 
prevent or isolate a settlement failure by provid- 
ing overnight credit at the end of a day. 
Reliance on daylight credit is not 
troubling in itself. Rather, it is the uncontrolled 
and unrationed provision of daylight credit that is 
troubling. As long as daylight credit is unrationed, 
risk creation is subsidized and daylight credit 
becomes overused. Fedwire has no explicit price 
for providing daylight credit and, because there is 
no well-developed private market for daylight 
credit, has little basis for setting such a price. 
Until the current risk-control policy began to be 
developed, Fedwire also did not have an effective 
limit on daylight overdrafts for any but visible 
problem banks. 
It can be argued that there is im- 
plicit pricing of daylight credit in net settlement 
systems.8  Receivers of funds transfers (suppliers of 
daylight credit) face a cost in the form of some pro- 
bability of loss. They therefore have an incentive 
to limit the amount of daylight credit they extend 
to each other participant. However, this argument 
is weak, unless the computerized net settlement 
system provides a feature that both allows partic- 
ipants to set such limits, and enforces them by 
preventing transfers that would breach a limit. 
Moreover, the whole argument breaks down 
when, as appears to have been the case, there is a 
widespread presumption among banks that the 
Federal Reserve, as the lender-of-last-resort, 
would lend to a participant that is otherwise 
unable to settle rather than let a settlement failure 
take place and risk a systemic wave of failures. 
I 
For  discussion of  risk and pricing, see David L. Mengle, "Daylight  8 Overdrafts and  Payment System Risks,"  Fconomic Review  kd- 
era1 Reserve Bank of  Richmond,  MaylJune 1985 pp. 14-27. 
11. The Mechanism for Risk Control 
The risk-control policy establishes three require- 
ments for every net settlement system: 1) each 
participant should be able to set a bilateral limit 
on the net amount of daylight overdraft credit it is 
willing to extend to each other participant; 2) 
each participant should be subject to a limit on 
the amount of daylight overdraft credit it uses; 3) 
the net settlement system should include an on- 
line monitor to reject or hold payments that 
would breach either limit.9 
In the case of Fedwire, banks will 
be subject to a daylight overdraft limit in the form 
of a dual "cap." One part of the cap limits a 
bank's average daylight overdraft position during 
a two-week required reserve maintenance period. 
The other part limits a bank's overdraft during 
any single day of that two-week period. 
A potential problem with inde- 
pendent daylight overdraft caps for each large- 
dollar system is that they would not distinguish 
institutions using only one system from those 
using two or more systems. Consequently, each 
net settlement system must provide data to the 
Federal Reserve so that it can monitor the risk 
exposure each bank creates simultaneously over  19 
all systems relative to that bank's daylight over- 
draft cap on Fedwire. If a bank's overdrafts across 
all systems exceed this limit, the Federal Reserve 
Bank could counsel the bank and/or advise the 
appropriate examiner about the situation, or the 
Federal Reserve could reject a bank's Fedwire 
transfers that exceed its overdraft limit. 
A bank seeking permission to run 
daylight overdrafts must undertake a self- 
evaluation of its creditworthiness, credit policies, 
and operational controls and procedures. This self- 
evaluation must include a review by its own board 
of directors, and the bank must maintain records 
as a basis for examiner inspection and comment 
to the directors. The bank thereby will establish 
its own overdraft limitations, but these must lie 
within Federal Reserve guidelines. The guidelines 
are expressed in terms of a multiple of the insti- 
tution's capital. (See box.) Should this volunatry 
process not be taken seriously, "...the Board (of 
Governors) will reconsider its options, including 
the adoption of regulations designed to impose 
explicit limits on daylight credit exp~sure."'~ 
In summary, each depository insti- 
tution, including each Federal Reserve Bank, can 
now manage the net amount of daylight credit it 
extends to each other institution; each institution 
must undergo self-evaluation necessary to obtain 
I 9 
This was a feature of  the Board's interim risk-reduction policy 
adopted in 1982. 
1  10 
Policy Statement Regarding Risks on  Large-Dollar Wire 
Transfer Systems, p.  10. 
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The Cross-System Net Debit 'Cap' 
At  the heart of the new risk-control policy is a cross-system 
sender net debit cap. The sender is a bank, making pay- 
ments over Fedwire. A net debit cap is a dollar limit on the 
amount of daylight credit a bank may draw by sending pay- 
ments in excess of the sum of its opening balance and pay- 
ments received up to any point during the day on Fedwire. 
The limit is "cross-system"  in that, for banks that participate 
in net settlement systems such as CHIPS, the amount of day- 
light credit allowed under the limit set on Fedwire will be 
reduced by the net amount of daylight credit the bank has 
drawn on those net settlement  system^.^ 
Clearly, a bank's cross-system daylight credit 
use, or net debit position, must vary over a day, beginning 
and ending at zero, but rising above zero whenever the 
opening balance, plus payments received, fall short of pay- 
ments made. The cross-system net debit cap has two forms. 
One is a limit on the two-week average of a bank's maximum 
daily net debit position, with the average taken over each 
two-week required reserve maintenance period. Averaging 
provides flexibility for banks to operate within the unpredic- 
table ebb and flow of payments traffic, while abiding by the 
intent of the risk-control policy. The other form of the cap is 
a limit on a bank's maximum net debit during each day of 
20  the two-week period. This cap is higher than the two-week 
average cap, but effectively puts a limit on the flexibility built 
into the averaging process. If a bank is at the one-day limit 
for one or more days of the period, then it must be below 
the two-week average for one or more days in order to stay 
within the average. 
Dual Cap 
Multiple of Adjusted Primary Capital 
Cap Class  Rvo-Week  Average  Plus  Single Day 
High  2.0  3.0 
Above Average  1.5  2.5 
Average  1 .O  1.5 
No Cap  0  0 
The Board's Policy Statement includes a discussion of the 
cap-setting  procedure banks should employ and how self- 
judgements of creditworthiness,  credit policies, and opera- 
tional controls and procedures might be combined into the 
single summary self-classification required to obtain a cap 
higher than zero." 
a. The Fedwire limit will not be raised if  a bank has been a net supplier of 
credit on a net settlement system. 
b. Other details of the procedure also are included in the Statement, includ- 
ing a definition of adjusted primary capital; treatment of Edge Act and 
Agreement Corporations,  U. S.  Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks, and 
New York Article XI1 Investment Companies; and implications for Book- 
entry Securities Transfers, Automated Clearinghouses, Net Settlement Ser- 
vices, and additional matters. 
a nonzero limit on the aggregate net amount of 
daylight credit it draws from all systems during an 
interval; the Federal Reserve Banks will monitor 
the daylight overdraft positions of institutions on 
Fedwire relative to their self-imposed caps, nor- 
mally after the fact, but net of any daylight credit 
obtained on other funds transfer networks. 
111.  Institutional Adjustments for Risk Reduction 
Incredulity  was a common reaction to early dis- 
cussions of reducing risk on large-dollar transfer 
systems.ll How could half-a-trillion dollars or more 
of daily payments possibly be resequenced so 
that, with only $20-30 billion of cash deposits, 
those payments could still be made, but with less 
reliance on daylight overdrafts?  Each sender might 
wait until enough payments were received before 
payments were sent, but every delayed send would, 
of course, mean a delayed receipt for someone 
else. Given the small cash base and limited time 
during which transfer networks are open (the 
working day sometimes extended into the even- 
ing), the result seemed more likely to be "grid- 
lock" than smoothly functioning transfers of funds. 
The emphasis on creating a risk-control mechanism 
first, with high overdraft limits based on self- 
evaluation, seems to have submerged this kind of 
reaction. But when future steps are taken to use 
the mechanism to reduce risk, how will smoothly 
operating payments be maintained consistent with 
reduced daylight overdrafts and reduced risk? 
Two kinds of changes, induced by 
market incentives, should take place that could 
achieve the desired result. One kind would pur- 
chase reduced risk directly, as individual banks 
reallocate their operating and portfolio resources 
to live within overdraft limits. The other kind 
would result from innovations in standard arrange- 
ments for interbank payments and financing. 
Direct Risk Reduction: Banks may 
reduce the amount of daylight credit they extend 
as well as reduce their own use of daylight credit 
simply because nationwide attention has focused 
on the problem. Heightened awareness and bet- 
ter information may bring more prudent behav- 
ior. While many banks have monitored and man- 
aged their own and their customers' daylight 
overdraft positions for many years, others appar- 
ently have not. As a result of the educational pro- 
gram and preparation accompanying implemen- 
tation of the Board of Governors' risk policy, 
banks now may be less generous in accommodat- 
ing other banks' and customers' use of daylight 
credit, thereby reducing their own need for day- 
light credit. Setting more prudent limits, or col- 
BOX  1  I 1  1  See. for example, Stigun. 
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lecting fees for scheduled extensions of daylight 
credit to customers, would have this effect. Sim- 
ilarly, with the ability to specify binding bilateral 
net credit limits in net settlement networks, 
banks may be less generous in accommodating 
other banks' use of  daylight credit. Risk reduction 
will then result both from reduced daylight over- 
drafts and from improved credit quality resulting 
from continuous, explicit risk management. 
Banks also might delay making 
some payments until later in the day in order to 
reduce their reliance on daylight credit. Of 
course, the resulting delayed receipts might in- 
crease reliance on daylight credit at other banks. 
However, many depositories and customers never 
use daylight credit and, in fact, maintain positive 
balances throughout the day. Thus, some overall re- 
duction in daylight credit is possible through more 
careful management of the timing of payments. 
Banks could elect to hold larger 
overnight balances at Federal Reserve Banks from 
which to make payments during the day. This 
might seem to be an expensive adjustment cost- 
ing a bank the foregone earnings on those extra re- 
serves. However, a bank can elect to hold addition- 
al sums as a clearing balance on which earnings 
credits can be used to pay for priced services. In 
either case, banks might make this a part of a least- 
costly method of reducing daylight overdrafts. 
Risk declines as bank capital 
grows, providing more room for institutions to 
operate within caps set on a "times capital" basis. 
Maintaining a higher capital position might also 
seem to be an expensive adjustment, but may be 
worth the price. Moreover, many banks are 
already adding, or planning to add, to capital as 
they adjust to potential loan quality problems and 
comply with regulatory guidelines for safety and 
soundness. Even without any change in daylight 
overdraft practices, more highly capitalized insti- 
tutions might present lower risk. 
Another fertile field for reducing 
daylight overdrafts lies in the liability manage- 
ment of depository institutions. About two-thirds 
of  Fedwire transfers reflect federal funds transac- 
tions, as borrowing banks repay the previous 
day's borrowing and then, typically, replace that 
with fresh borrowing for the current day. Extend- 
ing the maturity of  bank financing could yield 
substantial dividends in reduced Fedwire traffic 
and reduced daylight overdrafts of  Federal 
Reserve Bank accounts. Risk exposure of the 
Federal Reserve Banks certainly would decline, 
but risk exposure of others might grow. Longer- 
term financing would add to lenders' risk of  illiq- 
uidity (that is, of  using costly methods to meet 
unexpected needs for cash) and, all else 
unchanged, add to lenders' and borrowers' inter- 
est rate risk (that is, of  unexpected changes in 
maturity rate spreads). Uninsured lenders, replac- 
ing overnight with longer maturity loans, would 
also face a slightly different credit risk. No longer 
could they rely on Federal Reserve Banks to 
assume credit risk each morning, as they had 
when overnight loans had been returned. The 
"musical chairs" of repayment thus would be 
spaced further apart. 
Moving the bearer of risk from 
Federal Reserve Banks to private market lenders 
does not represent evasion of  risk-reduction pol- 
icy. Widening the scope of market scrutiny and 
the opportunity for risk pricing should be 
expected to encourage more conservative behav- 
ior by borrowing banks. 
Innovations: Substantial reductions 
in daylight overdrafts at individual banks could 
emerge from innovations.in  some long-standing 
market practices. Some of these innovations 
might only evade the risk-control mechanism by 
shifting risks outside the monitor, and will not be 
acceptable.12 Others would, in fact, reduce risk 
and are to be encouraged. Distinguishing 
between the innovations will require careful 
investigation. The three examples of suggested 
changes discussed here might be acceptable if 
carefully structured and are offered to indicate  21 
the range of  ideas being developed in the market 
in response to the risk-control policy. 
An  alternative to replacing over- 
night financing with longer-term borrowing 
would be to develop a "rollover" practice in 
overnight credit markets. Borrower and lender 
might agree that, unless either wished to termi- 
nate the entire credit, all or part would be rolled 
over at the relevant daily rate each day. A single 
daily transfer could cover interest, plus any agreed 
change in the outstanding amount of the loan. 
This would eliminate the need to transfer the full 
amount of  borrowing both back and forth each 
day. Credit risk from overnight lending would 
remain, but would not become a daily daylight 
payment risk either for the Federal Reserve or for 
participants in net settlement systems. 
Access to a rollover loan, as well as 
its price, presumably would depend on the credit- 
worthiness of  the borrower as viewed with more 
intense lender scrutiny than for a typical over- 
night loan today. In this way, the transfer of risk 
from Federal Reserve Banks and participants in 
net settlement systems should generate incentives 
for more conservative behavior by borrowers. 
Another substantial portion of the 
rdXc  on large-dollar transfer systems flows 
among banks that, for themselves or for dealer 
customers, are settling securities or foreign 
.......................................... 
The  Policy Statement (pp.  30-31) specifically, "reaffirms its  1  2  (earlier) policy that institutions may not use  Fedwire or  other 
payments networks as a method of  avoiding risk-reduction measures." 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Best available copyECONOMIC  REVIEW 
exchange transactions. Current practice typically 
involves gross next-day settlement of securities 
transactions, meaning that banks send one 
another payments for each transaction. Each day, 
two banks active in handling security market 
operations typically will send each other multi- 
million dollar payments that are more or less 
offsetting. These payments are initiated and 
received in automated systems on the basis of 
trades known in advance because they were done 
on the previous day. 
The alternative would be for two 
banks to offset the payments due to one another, 
replacing those two payments with a single trans- 
fer of the net difference due to one or the other 
institution. Daylight credit risk would be reduced 
if  the banks adopted new legal agreements defin- 
ing obligations to be for this net position rather 
than for gross positions.I3  Heretofore, the incen- 
tive for this kind of economizing on payments 
traffic was primarily the cost of a funds transfer- 
at most a few dollars per transfer. The additional 
incentive of avoiding more costly means of day- 
light overdraft reduction might provide the impe- 
tus for devising offset arrangements. As in the 
case of federal funds rollover, offset payments 
would not eliminate all risk. Banks would be ex- 
posed to risk of a failure to settle the net amount 
due, but the amount at risk would be much 
smaller than the gross amounts now exposed. 
Development of a day-loan market 
is another institutional change frequently cited as 
promising daylight overdraft relief. The Federal 
Funds market is the source of one-day maturity 
loans of cash in the form of deposit balances at a 
Federal Reserve Bank. Similarly, a day-loan 
market would be the source of loans of cash, but 
with same-day maturity. Just as banks may charge 
a fee to customers who daylight overdraft their 
accounts, so too, for a fee, banks might be able to 
borrow and lend cash for repayment later in the 
day. Such a procedure seems technologically feas- 
ible, especially if it were encouraged by provision 
for priority-funds transfer messages that would 
bypass a queue of payment orders on large-dollar 
transfer systems. Some banks will always have 
positive balances that might be loaned to others 
who want to make payments but who are at their 
daylight overdraft limits. 
A day-loan market is not an institu- 
tional development that would directly reduce 
risk. Rather, it would transfer risk from the Fed- 
eral Reserve Banks and the whole set of partici- 
pants in net settlement networks to the institutions 
making day loans. However, it may indirectly 
reduce risk by making exposures more visible so 
that market discipline would ration credit to risky 
institutions with increased certainty. 
These three examples of institu- 
tional changes-rollover, offset, and day loans- 
have not happened yet, but they, and others like 
them, suggest promising ways  in  which  market 
practices might be expected to adjust to future 
efforts to use the new risk-control mechanism to 
reduce risk in large-dollar transfer systems. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
An important result of the risk-control policy now 
in place is that each deposito~  institution's cross- 
system use of daylight credit can be monitored 
relative to caps that are themselves related to the 
institution's self-evaluated creditworthiness. Initial 
caps are not expected to result in any significant 
disruption in large-dollar funds transfer service. 
Nonetheless, some depository institutions are 
having to adjust their operations to meet the pol- 
icy limitations. This, plus the adjustments of other 
institutions recently sensitized to the risks, should 
at least dampen the growth of daylight overdraft 
risk exposures. However, conclusions must await 
experience under the new limitations because 
payments patterns may change in response to 
these initial adjustments, perhaps creating day- 
light overdraft problems for institutions that had 
not previously experienced them. 
Once the situation settles down, 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors fully 
expects to move further toward reducing risk, 
perhaps, for example, by ratcheting down "times- 
capital" cross-system daylight overdraft limits. In 
the meantime, banks can develop operational and 
institutional changes that will reduce and redirect 
risk without disrupting the payments system. In 
return, Federal Reserve Banks' risk exposure on 
Fedwire should diminish and market discipline 
should play a larger role in controlling risk. 
Such an  arrangement, said to be  the first of its kind, is 
expected to start operating soon in London, involving seltle- 
ment of  foreign exchange transactions among major international banks. 
See "International Financing Review," Issue 622, May 17,  1986, pp. 
1496-7. 
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